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Customs Law*
This short report briefly discusses three issues in U.S. customs law that will
affect the practice of Customs Law Committee members: the payment of interest
by the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) on overpayments of duties; the duti-
ability of payments in addition to invoice amounts by U.S. importers to foreign
manufacturers; and country of origin marking challenges by U.S. industries.
I. Interest Payments
When Customs liquidates merchandise, the importer must pay any duty owed
within fifteen days after the date of liquidation. ' If payment is not received within
thirty days, interest is due from the fifteenth day after the date of liquidation.2 In
addition, if there is a reliquidation of an entry as a result of a protest, an application
for relief for a clerical error or mistake of fact,3 or a court order, interest is to be
paid "on any amount paid as increased or additional duties. ' 4 Both of these
provisions were enacted as section 210 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. 5
Customs traditionally has interpreted these statutes as allowing it to collect
interest on all duties determined to be due upon liquidation that are not paid in
a timely manner.6 On the other hand, Customs has paid interest only on the
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1. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c).
2. Id.
3. Id. § 1520(c)(1).
4. Id. § 1520(d).
5. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 2977 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Hospital Corp. of Am. v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 455 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990),
appeal docketed, No. 91-1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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refund of additional duties that were collected at either the time of liquidation or
at the time of filing of a summons in the Court of International Trade challenging
the duty assessment. 7 In such cases, interest was paid from the date of payment
of the increased duties to the date of issuance of the refund check, or from the
date of payment of the increased duties to the date of filing of the summons, as
well as from that date to the date the refund was issued pursuant to the court
order.
In numerous decisions in 19909 the Court of International Trade has held that
Customs must pay interest on all amounts refunded as a result of a protest or
judicial action for the period from the date of liquidation through the date of the
refund or the filing of the summons, regardless of when the monies were de-
posited with Customs. t0 The court's rationale in reversing Customs' interpreta-
tion was that estimated duties deposited at entry become "increased or additional
duties" when retained by Customs at the time of liquidation if there is a later
refund of part or all of these duties. The court rejected Customs' position that the
term "increased or additional duties" refers only to those duties that Customs
finds are due at the time of liquidation in addition to any estimated duties already
deposited.
These decisions are now on appeal and Customs has not changed its practice
of not paying interest pending a decision on appeal." Customs has stated that
importers may seek review of a decision not to pay interest on a refund, but
protests that request payment of interest are being held pending the decision on
appeal. 12 Regardless of the resolution of these cases, there will most likely be
more interest payments to importers and to Customs in the future. Customs plans
to propose legislation in Congress in 1991 that would amend section 505 of the
Tariff Act of 193013 to permit Customs to assess interest on increased or addi-
tional duties or fees and to pay interest on excess duties and fees deposited with
interest accruing from the date the monies were or should have been deposited to
7. Id.
8. See Customs Service Ruling 220810 (1989); C.S.D. 88-2 (1987). Interest is payable under
28 U.S.C. § 2644 on monetary relief obtained through a judgment or stipulation agreement filed in
the Court of International Trade. Such interest is paid from the date of the filing of the summons until
the date of payment of the refund.
9. See, e.g., Kalan, Inc. v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 455 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), appeal
docketed, No. 91-1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 459
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-1172 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In related cases the court
found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158 I(i) to decide if interest should be paid. See Dornier Medical
Sys., Inc. v. United States, No. 90-99 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. United States,
No. 90-100 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990); Schumpert Medical Center, Inc. v. United States, No. 90-105
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1990); ESWL Ltd. Partnership v. United States, No. 90-101 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
10. Because § 1505(c) applies only to duties determined to be due upon liquidation or reliqui-
dation, § 1520(d) does not grant interest on a refund of estimated duties paid upon entry of the
merchandise from the date of payment of those duties. See Kalan, Inc. v. United States, 752 F. Supp.
455, 456 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
11. See Customs Telex 1653121 (Feb. 27, 1991).
12. Id.
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1505.
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the date they are collected or refunded. Other Customs reform legislation that
will soon be before Congress, a proposal supported by the Joint Industry Group,
would also provide for the collection and payment of interest in certain cases.
II. Additions to Dutiable Value
The majority of merchandise imported into the United States is assessed duties
on an ad valorem basis. Consequently, a determination of the value of the
merchandise being imported is essential. The statute sets out numerous bases for
the calculation of the value of imported merchandise, 14 but the value of the
overwhelming majority of merchandise imported into the United States is its
"transaction value." 
15
The statute specifically defines transaction value as the price actually paid or
payable 16 when sold for exportation to the United States and enumerates five
additions to the price paid or payable. 17 Two of these additions are for royalties
and license fees related to the imported merchandise that the buyer is required to
pay, directly or indirectly, as a condition of the sale of the imported merchandise
for exportation to the United States,18 and for the proceeds of any subsequent
resale, disposal, or use of the imported merchandise that accrue, directly or
indirectly, to the seller.19
Traditionally, Customs has held that if a payment by the importer to the
foreign manufacturer of a royalty or license fee is not dutiable as such, it cannot
be added to the price paid or payable as the proceeds of a subsequent resale,
disposal, or use of the imported merchandise. 20 This longstanding position of
Customs was overturned in a ruling issued in early 1991, in which Customs
found certain royalty payments made by a U.S. importer to the foreign producer
to be dutiable, not as royalty payments, but as proceeds of a subsequent sale.
21
In this 1991 ruling Customs reviewed the legislative history of the valuation
statute, which indicates that certain payments might be either royalties or the
proceeds of a subsequent sale, use, or disposal. 22 Based on this language, Cus-
toms found that its prior rulings were contrary to the congressional intent of
the statute and rendered meaningless the proceeds of a subsequent resale provi-
sion of the law. Having made this change in statutory construction, Customs
found the royalty payments to be proceeds of a subsequent sale because they
14. See id. § 1401a; 19 C.F.R. § 152.100-104 (1990).
15. See 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b).
16. See id. § 1401a(b)(4)(A).
17. See id. § 1401a(b)(1).
18. Id. § 1401a(b)(1)(D).
19. Id. § 1401a(b)(1)(E).
20. See, e.g., Customs Service Ruling 542844 (1982); Customs Service Ruling 544061 (1988);
Customs Service Ruling 544129 (1988); Customs Service Ruling 542900 (1982); Customs Service
Ruling 542926 (1983); Customs Service Ruling 543529 (1985); Customs Service Ruling 544102
(1989).
21. Customs Service Ruling 544436 (1991).
22. H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1979).
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became due upon the importer's resale of the imported merchandise and inured
to the benefit of the seller.
This ruling is a significant change in policy. Now, royalty payments made by
an importer to a foreign seller based on the resale of the imported merchandise
in the United States are probably part of dutiable value. This ruling also appears
to signal an increased use of the "proceeds of any subsequent resale, disposal or
use" provision by Customs in the future. In light of this ruling, importers should
review their agreements with foreign sellers and modify them, if possible, to
address this change in statutory interpretation. In addition, to avoid a penalty
case, importers must ensure that customs knows of all payments to foreign
producers of imported merchandise.
HI. Country of Origin Marking
The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, requires that, with certain exceptions,
every article of foreign origin (or its container in certain cases) imported into the
United States be marked in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and per-
manently as the nature of the article or the container will permit in such a manner
so as to indicate to the ultimate purchaser in the United States the English name
of the country of origin of the article. 23 In Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United
States Customs Service24 the issue of what is conspicuous marking as well as the
ability of U.S. producers to challenge country of origin marking of imported
products were at issue.
25
In Norcal California packagers of frozen produce challenged a ruling by Cus-
toms that permitted the marking of the country of origin on the rear panel on
frozen vegetable packages. 26 The court found that this ruling deviated from the
clear language of the statute as well as from the congressional purpose behind the
statute in that it permitted marking that was not conspicuous. The court said that
the term "conspicuous" should be interpreted in a manner consistent with its
common meaning and the Customs regulations. 27 The Court noted that in other
rulings Customs had required that the country of origin marking be where the
consumer expects to see the country of origin. 28 The court stated that conspic-
uous marking does not necessarily mean in type size comparable to the product
description or in a contrasting color, but it does mean clear to the naked eye.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1304.
24. No. 91-12 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991), appealfiled (Fed. Cir. 1991).
25. The court found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) despite strenuous objections by
the government, and both parties moved for summary judgment. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v.
United States Customs Serv., 731 F. Supp. 510 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990). The court seemed to
recognize that if it lacked jurisdiction, the plaintiff would lose its day in court because Norcal had
brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California that was trans-
ferred by stipulation to the court of International Trade.
26. Customs Service Ruling 731830 (1988).
27. See 19 C.F.R. § 134.41(b) (1990).
28. See C.S.D. 90-41 (1990).
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In deciding if the marking were conspicuous, the court considered the location
of the marking and whether consumers could be assured of easily finding the
marking upon a reasonable inspection of the package. The court took judicial
notice of the common method of displaying frozen vegetables, so that only the
front panel is clearly visible. The court stated that consumers are not able to scan
the labels of frozen food as easily as they do for dry goods because access is
limited in that the food must remain in a freezer and must not defrost. These
"special factors" involved in the marketing of frozen food products prevent
consumers from having the opportunity to see the country of origin marking if it
is on the back of the package in small print. The court noted that the front panel
had an abundance of space that would accommodate the mandated disclosure
more legibly than at present and that therefore the markings were not as con-
spicuous or as legible as the packages would permit.
Another important point in this decision was the discussion by the court of
Customs' apparent attempt to implement the country of origin marking require-
ment so that it would be administratively workable. Customs stated that the
stamping of the country of origin together with an expiration date onto the
packages would facilitate compliance with the marking laws and allow packers
to have a small number of standard packages with space left available for input-
ting information unique to the package. In response, the court stated that Cus-
toms should not place the convenience of packers above the law and specifically
noted that certain packages were marked with multiple countries of origin and as
such were insufficiently marked and must be refused entry until marked with the
actual country of origin. 29 On the other hand, seemingly recognizing the eco-
nomic prohibition exemption in the statute, 30 the court stated that nowhere did
defendants contend that any harm would befall Customs or amici curiae if the
intent of Congress were implemented and the packages were marked in accor-
dance with the law so that the consumer was actually informed of the source of
the product.
Norcal is a significant decision. While it did not result in a change in the
regulations or, in general, in the prior interpretations by Customs of the country
of origin marking statute, it did suggest that country of origin marking must be
in the most prominent location on the package and did demonstrate that Customs'
rulings in this area are subject to challenge and to review by the courts at the
request of U.S. producers.
29. This statement appears to invalidate prior Customs rulings concerning the country of origin
marking of orange juice, which allowed the imported juice concentrate to be marked "may contain
concentrate from Florida and/or Brazil," see C.S.D. 86-27 (1986), and country of origin marking
concerning fasteners, see C.S.D. 84-56 (1983). Furthermore certain packages listed the name and
U.S. address of the manufacturer, but without nearby notations of the country of origin as required
by the regulations. See C.F.R. § 134.46 (1990). The court indicated that the country of origin should
be on the same panel as the address of the U.S. distributor.
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(c); 19 C.F.R. § 134.3(a) (1990).
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